

As it has long been reported, Indonesia’s over-reliance on China is a warning for other Global South countries,
[A year ago, in June 2025], China imposed a 20% anti-dumping tariff on stainless steel from Indonesia … The penalty will remain in place for five years. But the real story isn’t the tariff. It’s the reckoning behind it: Indonesia is losing control of its most prized asset. And it has only itself to blame …
The country may sit on the world’s largest nickel reserves, but China holds the value—and the power. That imbalance didn’t happen by accident. It was the result of weak governance, poor planning, and a political system too eager to please investors rather than protect national interests …
The recent tariff from Beijing underscores just how exposed Jakarta has become. “The anti-dumping duty will erode the competitiveness of Indonesian products due to shrinking profit margins,” said Sudirman Widhy Hartono, chair of the Indonesian Mining Experts Association (Perhapi) …
Around a quarter of Indonesia’s exports go to China (mainly commodities such as Nickel, mineral fuels, steel), and 36% of its imports come from China (machinery, electronic equipment, vehicles, plastics). Indonesia’s trade volume with China is higher than with the entire ASEAN.
With more debt owed to China (the bond buyers are China-linked investors only), Indonesia’s dependence on China is likely set to rise, the island country’s industrial development about to slow down.
Why? The article linked in this comment says it clear, using the Nickel industry as an example as Indonesia has the world’s largest nickel reserves:
This isn’t the end stage of Indonesia’s nickel policy. It’s the middle. For all the talk of “downstreaming,” most of what Indonesia produces—nickel pig iron (NPI), ferronickel, and stainless steel billets—are still intermediate products. “They’re not the final products of nickel downstreaming,” Sudirman noted. “The domestic downstream industry is still not developed. Nearly all NPI and stainless steel is still exported abroad.”
Why didn’t Indonesia develop those downstream industries? The answer, in part, is corruption.
From sweetheart land deals to opaque tax incentives, many of the major industrial projects were fast-tracked with little transparency and minimal safeguards. Environmental and labor regulations were ignored. Licensing became transactional. Strategic decisions were too often made behind closed doors, benefiting a narrow circle of elites rather than the broader public.
Chinese companies, predictably, capitalized. They responded to the incentives they were given—cheap land, tax holidays, and a compliant regulatory environment. They brought capital and technology, but on their terms. Indonesia never set the rules of the game. It simply played along …
This bond will not cut dependence on the US dollar, it will increase dependence on China’s coercive policies, making Indonesia more vulnerable for Beijing’s coercion such as tariffs and other punishable trade measure.
It’s almost funny that whenever the Florida man imposes tariffs, the media is full of (absolutely justified) critique. If China creates the same trade restrictions, the media is largely silent. As if it made any difference.



























The use of Yuan (and currencies other than USD) is still quite low as the article says.
Would betting on Yuan be a good idea for Thailand?
China would have an additional measure to pressure the government in Bangkok for whatever political or economic gains Beijing is aiming at, simply by devaluing (or appreciating) its currency.
This is important as the bilateral trade between the two countries tells a story well known from many others of China’s trade partners: In 2025, Thailand’s exports to China reached almost USD 40 billion, while imports from China were significantly higher at USD 108 billion.
Thailand’s deficit with China in 2025 - USD 68 billion - represents an increase by 50% year-on-year and ranks among the steepest annual widenings of all of China’s trade partners in the Asian region, second only to Malaysia’s 62% deficit increase and similar to Vietnam’s 40% jump.
Maybe more importantly, Thailand’s trade deficit with China has grown every single year for the past five years.
The devastating consequence of China’s export surge is industrial contraction. Thailand’s Kasikorn Research Center estimates that 4,300 Thai factories closed in the two years to 2025, spanning automotive, electronics, garments, furntiture, steel. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has issued a forecast of 1.6% and the World Bank anticipates approximately 1.7% - the lowest growth rate for Thailand outside of crisis mode like the pandemic or the 2008 turmoils.
If and when the Yuan gains ground in Thailand China-trade in a meaningful way, Bangkok risks its economy (and politics) to open up for more coercive tactics and exploitation by Beijing.